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I am delighted to provide this personal tribute to Professor Yale Kamisar, to his
teaching, to his scholarship, and to his contributions to the American legal system.1
Throughout my study and career in the law, I have been fortunate to have had
many great teachers. Of these, Yale Kamisar is one of the best. I was Professor
Kamisar's student at the University of Michigan Law School, from which I received
my law degree in 1973. I sat in Professor Kamisar's criminal procedure class in the
early days of my law school education, learned more about his scholarship when I
served on the Michigan Law Review, and have remained interested in his scholarship
over the decades since. I have enhanced my continuing studies of the law, after I was
sworn in as a federal appellate judge, with Professor Kamisar's assistance. My
strongest impressions of Yale Kamisar are those I have of him teaching, past and
present.
Another of my teachers, and one with a special connection both to me and to
Professor Kamisar, was the late Honorable Wade H. McCree Jr. Judge McCree was a
Circuit Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. He
thereafter served as the Solicitor General of the United States, and subsequently
accepted a position proximate to Professor Kamisar as a distinguished professor at the
University of Michigan Law School. When I was a law student, Professor Kamisar
introduced me to Judge McCree and recommended that Judge McCree hire me as his
law clerk. I got the job, and much that was good in my legal career followed from
that opportunity. I also know in what high regard Judge McCree held Professor
Kamisar. Thus, I invoke Judge McCree's ideas ;n aid of my tribute to Professor
Kamisar.
Judge McCree advanced the theory that academics, lawyers, and the courts were
partners in the process of developing the law.2 Citing the many ways that scholars
and judges interacted, Judge McCree wrote of the "symbiotic relationship" between
American legal scholars, such as Professor Kamisar, and judges who cooperate on the
Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
I write in a personal capacity and not on behalf of the Court on which I serve. However, in the
interest of full disclosure, I confess that I have a bias in favor of Professor Kamisar. Since my
appointment to the federal bench, I have had a series of law clerks from the University of Michigan Law
School, each of whom has performed his or her duties with distinction: Carolyn Barth, Matthew
Andelman, Sanne Knudsen, Gus Sandstrom, Anne Kanyusik, and Jean Rhee. Joining me next year is
Aaron Lewis. All of these Michigan law clerks came to me on Professor Kamisar's personal
recommendation.
2 See Wade H. McCree, Jr., Partners in a Process: The Academy and the Courts, 37 WASH. &
LEEL. REv. 1041 (1980).
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path of legal development. 3 Here is how the process works: Nascent legal principles
often germinate in the classrooms of law schools, and in the scholarly writings of law
professors.4 These principles come to the attention ofjudges through articles in law
journals, from the briefings and arguments of the advocates who appear before them
(the advocates themselves also being students of these scholars), and from the judges'
associations with academia.5 Judges, in concrete cases, apply the best of these
principles, transforming what started as academic thought, or the inspired thought of
advocates, into applied law with precedential effect. Academics, in turn, vigilantly
scrutinize and criticize these judicial applications, leading to the development of still
new theories, and to the refinement of established ones.6
One of the premises underlying this view is that judges are permanent students.
The education received in America's law schools is only the beginning of a future
jurist's legal study. In practice and on the bench, judges continue to learn from legal
academics, whose ideas help to shape the evolution of the law. A law professor's
contribution is thus determined not only by expertise in the law, but also through the
ability to convey ideas persuasively to students, including judges-as-life-long-
students.
The very greatest legal scholars often are also great teachers, for in my opinion
the most powerful contributions to the legal system are likely to come from those who
shape the law not only by their research and writing, but also by reaching the hearts of
their students in teaching. By this standard, as by any standard, Yale Kamisar is one
of America's great law professors.
I first encountered Yale Kamisar when I studied criminal procedure at the
University of Michigan Law School. Many lawyers and judges will recall fondly
those law professors who taught them to "think like a lawyer," to see as a whole our
system of law. In 1971, Professor Kamisar instructed me in the mysteries of the
constitutional aspects of criminal procedure. He was an excellent teacher, and his
class was exciting.
Indeed, I would assert that Professor Kamisar is a great teacher even if I had no
authority beyond what I saw and heard in his Michigan classroom. Any person could
benefit from the stimulating moral and intellectual atmosphere of Professor Kamisar's
criminal procedure class. For me, regardless of how much I studied the cases in his
casebook, his questioning in class would take my thoughts beyond where they had
been before I entered the classroom. Professor Kamisar's experience (when I took his
class, he had "only" been a professor for about fifteen years), his advocacy for a
system fair to those accused of serious crimes, and his insistence that courts give
logical reasons for rulings, all contributed to my introduction to and understanding of
the law.
I trust that my high regard for Professor Kamisar's abilities would be endorsed
3 Id. at 1042, 1053.
4 Id. at 1042-44.
Id. at 1044.
6 Id. at 1056.
[Vol 2:3
A STUDENT'S TRIBUTE TO Y4LE K4M.ISAR
by any person applying objective criteria. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., in an 1886
address to the Harvard Law School Association, spoke on The Use of Law Schools.7
Professor Kamisar measures up well when tested by Holmes's ideas. In describing
the methods of instruction and learning that make a law school great, Justice Holmes
postulated that "[t]he main part of intellectual education is not the acquisition of facts,
but learning how to make facts live.",8 As I witnessed first-hand in his criminal
procedure class, Yale Kamisar is a master at bringing cases to life, and he animated
not just facts, but also the legal principles for which the cases stand. Here is Holmes
again, stressing that great teachers inspire students to want to learn: "Education, other
than self-education, lies mainly in the shaping of men's [and women's] interests and
aims." 9 Professor Kamisar had a way of inspiring the interests of his students in a fair
criminal process that honored the dignity of each individual charged with a crime, and
that appreciated the need for fair procedures, no matter how serious the crime. Those
students who heard Professor Kamisar hold forth will well understand Holmes's point.
Further, Holmes commended a law school faculty's aim to "obtain for teachers men
[and women] in each generation who are producing the best work of that
generation."' 0 By any intellectual and moral measure, Professor Kamisar's work
belongs in the vanguard of the best and brightest of his generation.
Professor Kamisar's thoughtful classroom questioning of his students inevitably
revealed the limits of our knowledge, encouraging more study. Professor Kamisar's
skill at what is sometimes called the "Socratic" method is unparalleled. I don't think
any student, indeed any person however broadly educated, could stand before his
questions without realizing that there were deeper ways to look at a legal problem.
But at the same time, Professor Kamisar's questioning was never undertaken in a way
that ridiculed a student's lack of knowledge. The feeling in his class was, "let us
consider this problem together." A more skillful use of "what if?" and "so what!"
perhaps has never been made. To paraphrase Justice Holmes's 1886 oration: If you
convince a person that another way of looking at things is more profound, that person
will desire the profounder thought." If my classroom experiences with Professor
Kamisar were at all like those of the thousands of future lawyers who enrolled in his
law school courses, I can safely say that Professor Kamisar's classroom training of
future advocates, judges, and scholars exemplifies the greatness of which Justice
Holmes spoke.
Professor Kamisar's methods of legal analysis did not merely help me to
understand criminal procedure and attendant constitutional law, though if that were all
it would have been enough. Justice Holmes spoke of "the enthusiasm of the lecture
room," and of how great teaching "should not stop, but rather should foster,
7 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Use of Law Schools, in 8 MODERN ELOQUENCE 700 (Thomas
B. Reed ed., 1900).
8 Id. at 701.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 703; see also infra notes 14 and 19.
" Holmes, supra note 7, at 701.
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production," as a teacher's "enthusiasm" is imparted to students.' 2  Professor
Kamisar's classroom teaching fulfilled these high aims. After learning from Professor
Kamisar, his analytical methods helped me better to understand every subject I studied
for the rest of my time in law school. These same methods have been of benefit in my
role as a judicial law clerk upon graduation, in my subsequent practice in corporate
litigation for more than two decades, and in my present work on the federal bench.
Professor Kamisar's important contributions as a scholar are well-known. I am
perhaps not the best person to speak of his scholarship, which will be addressed by
law professors who studied in his field. 13 But I wish to add my impression as a
student who pondered the cases and questions in the casebook then prepared by
Professors Kamisar, LaFave, and Israel in Modern Criminal Procedure, the current
edition of which commands a position on the bookshelf in my judicial chambers.14
Many of the cases we studied in it, such as Mapp v. Ohio,'5 Gideon v. Wainwright,
6
Miranda v. Arizona,17 and Katz v. United States,'8 remain beacons of our
constitutional law, pointing to the inviolable rights of those enmeshed in the criminal
process. Not only in this casebook, but also in his detailed writings on the rights of
the accused and the limits of police power under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,' 9
Professor Kamisar has aided our courts by emphasizing the importance of balancing
reason and fair play, on the one hand, with efficiency, deterrence, and retribution, on
the other, as these competing interests struggle for a role in our criminal process.
A LEXIS search reveals no fewer than thirty-one United States Supreme Court
opinions which have relied to some extent on Professor Kamisar's publications. He
has also been cited in more than 100 opinions of our federal appellate courts, and in
twice that number of opinions issued by state supreme courts. Citation in any court
opinion is a sign of the influence of one's legal scholarship. Yet, we should be
" Id. at 703.
13 Those who wish to comment in detail on Professor Kamisar's scholarship will have plenty to
say. Professor Kamisar's curriculum vitae reveals no fewer than twenty publications from the year 2000
to the present, a considerable number for any professor in the prime of his or her career, let alone one
nearing retirement.
14 YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (10th ed. 2002). In law school I studied
from the second edition, so it has stood well against the test of time.
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
16 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
'7 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
19 Professor Kamisar's authorship extends beyond his influential work on criminal procedure. To
cite an example of Professor Kamisar's varied scholarly interests, he has written on the topic of assisted
suicide and the right to die. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, The "Right to Die ": On Drawing (and Erasing)
Lines, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 481 (1996); Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide-Even in a Very Limited
Form, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 735 (1995). In Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997),
affirming the constitutionality of Washington state's ban on physician-assisted suicide, both Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion and a concurring opinion penned by Justice Souter cited Professor
Kamisar's work on this topic. See id. at 733 n.23, 755, 777 (Souter, J., concurring).
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particularly impressed by the several landmark decisions that have rested, in part, on
Professor Kamisar's work. Foremost, of course, is Miranda. Others include some of
the Supreme Court's leading cases on the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule-
Arizona v. Evans,2 ° United States v. Leon,2' and Nix v. Williams.22 His work on
assisted suicide, of which he has been a vociferous opponent, was quoted in detail in
Judge Beezer's dissent from the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in Compassion in
Dying v. Washington,23 holding unconstitutional a Washington statute prohibiting
physicians from prescribing life-ending medication to terminally ill adults. The
Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari, and relying in part on Professor
Kamisar's work, reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision.24 The effect that Professor
Kamisar's work has had on shaping our law typifies the "fruitful" and
"complementary" process between courts and great professors that Judge McCree
thought so "significant in the development of the law.",
25
Recently, I again experienced first-hand Professor Kamisar's dual role as teacher
and scholar. In addition to handling my cases, I worked this past year on an article
reexamining the applicability and scope of the Fourth Amendment's probable cause
standard in cases involving catastrophic threats.26 I sent a draft of my analysis to
Professor Kamisar requesting his comments. He responded generously with a detailed
comment letter in a quality comparable to published work, and enthusiastically set
forth his ideas about how the analysis might be improved. His perspectives, borne of
a lifetime of scholarship, ranged broadly over the topic. His ideas led me to analyze
each potential doctrinal idea in even greater depth. As examples, Professor Kamisar
pointed out a dissent of Justice Marshall, written decades ago, that bore on one of my
arguments; he also pointed to a recent opinion of Justice O'Connor that shed light on
another issue discussed; and where I had addressed and quoted an eminent scholar in
20 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
21 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
22 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
23 79 F.3d 790, 850-52 (9th Cit. 1996) (en banc) (Beezer, J., dissenting).
24 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
25 McCree, supra note 2, at 1052, 1055. Nowhere is this complementary process more evident
than in Professor Kamisar's devotion to defending the protections assured to the accused by Miranda. In
part because of Professor Kamisar's persistent and skillful help, Miranda has become not only a cultural
icon, but also a constitutional fixture. The Supreme Court's decision in Dickerson v. United States, 530
U.S. 428 (2000), reaffirmed Miranda's constitutional footing. This may have surprised some, but it only
vindicated Professor Kamisar's good judgment.
In my chambers, I have a framed picture of Professor Kamisar holding an open law book. A
careful observer will notice that the book's pages are covered with multiple colors of highlighting. Some
passages are highlighted in yellow, some pink, some green, and some blue. One who looks even closer
will recognize that this is Professor Kamisar's highlighted copy of the Supreme Court's Miranda
decision, and the highlighting reveals the depth of a scholar's analysis.
26 Ronald M. Gould & Simon Stem, Catastrophic Threats and the Fourth Amendment, 77 S. CAL.
L. REV. 777 (2004) (Dr. Stern was a former law clerk and is now an associate at the law firm of Shea &
Gardener.)
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his field on another point, Professor Kamisar gave me some citations to related work
of the same scholar that permitted me to understand that scholar's position even
better. Professor Kamisar had not only a scholar's sense of the arguments weighing
on an issue; he had a historian's remembrance and recollection of the relevant
literature and its treatment of pertinent ideas.
When I think back on Professor Kamisar's teaching, consider his scholarship,
and reflect on his thoughtful recent comments on my research and writing, I see that
he has been both profound and consistent. Professor Kamisar starts with as
comprehensive an analysis as likely can be mustered on any issue, and he then follows
with an open mind to consider new ideas and to add to his learning. In all this he puts
reason at the fore. No doctrine that cannot be supported by reason will get much
praise from him, no matter how high the authority that pronounces it. This is as it
should be. As I have said, scholars work in cooperation with judges and with
advocates in a process that improves the law. Professor Kamisar speaks directly to the
decision-makers and judges of our era; he has trained the advocates who present
arguments to them; and his work has rippling effects of incalculable magnitude.
Judge McCree concluded his discussion of the cooperation between the Academy
and the Courts in the development of the law by writing that "all of us are the
beneficiaries of this process. ' '27 In the context of Professor Kamisar's career of
scholarship, Judge McCree' s statement undoubtedly rings true. One cannot imagine
that our law, particularly constitutional criminal procedure, would be what it is today
absent Professor Kamisar's tireless work and profound intellectual insight.
I am proud to have been Professor Kamisar's student at the University of
Michigan Law School. I am proud to be his student today. I join his many admirers
in wishing Yale Kamisar well.
27 McCree, supra note 2, at 1056.
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